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On the meaning and measurement of maximization
Nathan N. Cheek∗ Barry Schwartz†
Abstract
Building on Herbert Simon’s critique of rational choice theory, Schwartz et al. (2002) proposed that when making choices,
some individuals — maximizers — search extensively through many alternatives with the goal of making the best choice,
whereas others — satisficers — search only until they identify an option that meets their standards, which they then choose.
They developed the Maximization Scale (MS) to measure individual differences in maximization, and a substantial amount of
research has now examined maximization using the MS, painting a picture of maximizers that is generally negative. Recently,
however, several researchers have criticized the MS, and almost a dozen new measures of maximization have now been
published, resulting in a befuddling and contradictory literature. We seek to clarify the confusing literature on the measurement
of maximization to help make sense of the existing findings and to facilitate future research. We begin by briefly summarizing
the understanding of maximizers that has emerged through research using Schwartz et al.’s MS. We then review the literature
on the measurement of maximization, attempting to identify the similarities and differences among the 11 published measures
of maximization. Next, we propose a two-component model of maximization, outlining our view of how maximization should
be conceptualized and measured. Our model posits that maximization is best understood as the pursuit of the maximization
goal of choosing the best option through the maximization strategy of alternative search; other constructs such as decision
difficulty and regret are best considered outcomes or causes — rather than components — of maximization. We discuss
the implications of our review and model for research on maximization, highlighting what we see as pressing unanswered
questions and important directions for future investigations.
Keywords: maximizing, satisficing, choice, decision making, goals, strategies
1 Introduction
There is more choice in the world than ever before, and
the modern explosion of choice can have both positive and
negative consequences for consumers (e.g., Broniarczyk &
Griffin, 2014; Chernev, Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2015;
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000, 2004, 2010). For
instance, having more choices can make people feel empow-
ered and in control of their lives (e.g., Fischer & Boer, 2011;
Langer & Rodin, 1976; Ryan & Deci, 2000) — indeed, peo-
ple report feeling more free when they have more options
to choose from (e.g., Reibstein, Youngblood & Fromkin,
1975). Yet having many choices can also be overwhelming,
leading to choice paralysis (i.e., failure to make any choice;
Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), and increasing regret, dissatisfac-
tion, and unhappiness (e.g., Chernev et al., 2015; Schwartz,
2000, 2004). And this dark side of choice may be more
salient for some individuals than for others, depending on
a number of important factors such as their backgrounds,
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goals, strategies, cognitive styles, traits, and more. One such
individual difference that has attracted substantial attention
from researchers in recent years is maximization— the goal
of making the best choice (Schwartz et al., 2002).
Simon (1955, 1956, 1957) originally proposed a distinc-
tion between maximizing and satisficing in a critique of ra-
tional choice theory. He argued that because of inherent lim-
its on people’s information processing abilities, as well as
the potentially limitless number of options from which to
choose, people cannot actually make the best possible de-
cision (i.e., maximize or optimize) in the way posited by
economic theory. Rather, people satisfice — that is, find
an option that successfully satisfies their decision goals and
preferences:
. . . from the examination of the postulates of these
economic models it appears probable that, how-
ever adaptive the behavior of organisms in learn-
ing and choice situations, this adaptiveness falls
short of the ideal of “maximizing” postulated in
economic theory. Evidently, organisms adapt well
enough to “satisfice”; they do not, in general, “op-
timize”1 (Simon, 1956, p. 129).
Thus, in Simon’s view, people are satisficers who seek op-
tions that are “good enough”, instead of maximizers who
1Although some authors use “maximize” and “optimize” to refer to dif-
ferent concepts, we use the two terms interchangeably in this review.
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seek the undeniably best option. Satisficers’ standards of
acceptability may be dynamic, such that, over time and with
exposure to better choice options, they may increase gradu-
ally, leading to standards that approach maximization. Ac-
cording to Simon, however, the explicit goal of maximiza-
tion is neither achievable nor sought by finite cognitive crea-
tures like human beings.
Building on Simon’s (1955, 1956, 1957) original work,
Schwartz et al. (2002) proposed that individuals differ in
their decision goals, such that some people are maximiz-
ers who strive to make the best choice, whereas others are
satisficers who strive to make choices that meet their stan-
dards without necessarily being the best.2 To explore indi-
vidual differences in maximization, Schwartz et al. devel-
oped the Maximization Scale (MS), which has since been
used in most maximization studies. Recently, however, sev-
eral researchers have criticized the validity and reliability of
the MS, and almost a dozen new measures of maximization
have been published in the fourteen years since Schwartz et
al.’s initial research. Each new measure carries with it a dis-
tinct conceptualization — implicit or explicit — of what it
means to maximize, which has produced a befuddling lit-
erature with many competing views of maximization. The
proliferation of measures and definitions of maximization
makes it difficult to interpret and compare competing re-
search findings, and future research may be hampered be-
cause researchers do not know which measure of maximiza-
tion to use.
In the present review, we seek to clarify the confusing lit-
erature on the measurement of maximization to help make
sense of the existing conflicting findings and to facilitate
future research. We begin by briefly exploring the under-
standing of maximizers that has emerged through research
using Schwartz et al.’s (2002) MS to establish the context in
which newer maximization scales emerged. We then review
the literature on the measurement of maximization, attempt-
ing to identify the similarities and differences among the 11
published measures of maximization. Next, we propose a
two-component model of maximization with the goals of
integrating the myriad of theories and of distinguishing be-
tween maximization and related constructs. Drawing on this
model, we discuss which scales, in our opinion, should be
used by future researchers to measure the two components
of maximization. Finally, we discuss the implications of
our review and model for research on maximization, high-
lighting what we see as pressing unanswered questions and
important directions for future investigations. Our aim in
this review is principally to provide conceptual clarification
of what “maximization” should be understood to mean, be-
cause we believe that conceptual clarification is needed to
2Research on maximization characterizes maximizing tendencies as a
continuous individual difference variable, but, for the ease of discussion,
we will use the terms “maximizers” and “satisficers” as if they are categor-
ically distinct.
facilitate further fruitful empirical investigation.
2 Maximizing research using the
Maximization Scale
A substantial amount of research has now examined maxi-
mization using Schwartz et al.’s (2002) MS, and the picture
painted of maximizers is generally, though not always, quite
negative. In this section, we attempt to provide an overview
of previous research using the MS. Our goal is not to ex-
haustively review all existing research, but rather to provide
a summary of current understandings of the differences be-
tween maximizers and satisficers.
As measured by the MS, maximizers tend to be more
prone to regret (Besharat, Ladik & Carrillat, 2014; Bruine
de Bruin, Dombrovski, Parker & Szanto, in press; Moyano-
Díaz, Cornejo, Carreño & Muñoz, 2013; Parker, Bruine
de Bruin & Fischhoff, 2007; Purvis, Howell & Iyer, 2011;
Spunt, Rassin & Epstein, 2009; Schwartz et al., 2002), more
perfectionistic (Bergman, Nyland & Burns, 2007; Chang
et al., 2011; Dahling & Thomas, 2012; Schwartz et al.,
2002), less optimistic (Schwartz et al., 2002), greedier (Se-
untjens, Zeelenberg, van de Ven, & Breugelmans, 2015),
and more neurotic (Purvis et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002)
than satisficers. Maximizers are also less open (Purvis et
al., 2011), less happy (Larsen & McKibban, 2008; Polman,
2010; Purvis et al., 2011; Schwartz et al., 2002), lower in life
satisfaction (Chang et al., 2011; Dahling & Thomas, 2012;
Schwartz et al., 2002), more hopeless (Bruine de Bruin et
al., in press), more present-focused (Besharat et al. 2014;
Carrillat, Ladik & Legoux, 2011), more prone to procras-
tination (Osiurak et al., 2015), less well adjusted (Chang
et al., 2011), and are more likely to engage in counterfac-
tual thinking (Leach & Patall, 2013; Schwartz et al., 2002)
and ruminate about the past (Paivandy, Bullock, Reardon &
Kelly, 2008). Furthermore, relative to satisficers, maximiz-
ers have lower self-esteem (Osiurak et al., 2015; Schwartz
et al., 2002) and are more at risk for depression (Bruine
de Bruin et al., in press; Schwartz et al., 2002), attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Schepman, Weyandt, Schlect
& Swentosky, 2012), and suicide (Bruine de Bruin et al., in
press). Studies also suggest that older people are less likely
to maximize than younger people (e.g., Purvis et al., 2011;
Tanius, Wood, Hanoch & Rice, 2009) and that maximization
is somewhat heritable (Simonson & Sela, 2011).
When making decisions, maximizers engage in more
comparison of options (Schwartz et al., 2002), consider
more options (Chowdury, Ratneshwar & Mohanty, 2009;
Dar-Nimrod, Rawn, Lehman & Schwartz, 2009; Polman,
2010; Schwartz et al., 2002; Yang & Chiou, 2010), and
expend more time and effort in the decision process (Mis-
uraca & Teuscher, 2013; Polman, 2010; Schwartz et al.,
2002) than satisficers. Unfortunately, this additional effort
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does not appear to bring additional rewards for maximizers,
as maximizers are often less satisfied with their decisions
(Chowdhury et al., 2009; Dahling & Thomas, 2012; Iyen-
gar, Wells & Schwartz, 2006; Leach & Patall, 2013; Sparks,
Ehrlinger & Eibach, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2002; though
see Shiner, 2015), despite attempting to minimize the likeli-
hood of regret (Schwartz et al., 2002) and sacrificing more
resources to gain access to more choices (Dar-Nimrod et
al., 2009). Maximizers also experience more negative af-
fect and stress during the decision process (Chowdhury et al,
2009; Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Spunt et al., 2009) and often
employ poor decision making strategies (Bruine de Bruin,
Parker & Fischhoff, 2007; Parker et al., 2007). Indeed, it
may be these decision strategies that lead to more regret and
dissatisfaction, as greater comparison of different options
and a preference for larger choice sets can undermine sat-
isfaction with choices (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyengar &
Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004; Yang & Chiou, 2010).
Maximizers may also experience more regret and unhap-
piness because they engage in more social comparison in
general and more upward social comparison in particular.
For instance, Schwartz et al. (2002) found that maximiz-
ers were more prone to upward social comparison than sat-
isficers, and that upward social comparison predicted un-
happiness and regret. Maximizers are also more sensi-
tive to the effects of social comparison (Schwartz et al.,
2002) and readily use social comparison information over
other relevant information to judge the quality of their per-
formance (Polman, 2010). Social comparison may under-
mine maximizers’ happiness because they rely on exter-
nal criteria to make their decisions, rather than relying on
more personally-relevant information (Iyengar et al., 2006;
Parker et al., 2007). Furthermore, even if their choices pro-
duce better outcomes than expected, maximizers are still
regretful when other people’s choices turn out better than
their own, whereas satisficers are happy with unexpectedly
good choice outcomes regardless of the outcomes of other
people’s decisions (Huang & Zeelenberg, 2012). In other
words, social comparison heightens maximizers’ suscepti-
bility to regret. Recent research has also underlined the im-
portance of impression management and social competition
for maximizers — Lin (2015) showed that, unlike satisfi-
cers, maximizers change their choice patterns depending on
whether their decisions are public or private, and Weaver,
Daniloski, Schwarz and Cottone (2015) suggested that max-
imizers do not only want to choose the best; they want to be
the best as well.
Interestingly, although maximizers often experience
worse subjective decision outcomes, they often achieve bet-
ter objective decision outcomes. For example, in a study of
college seniors applying for jobs, Iyengar et al. (2006; see
also Polman, 2010) found that maximizers had more success
in their job hunts: the mean salary of maximizers was about
$7,500 higher than that of satisficers. The strategies maxi-
mizers use to attain better objective outcomes, however, are
often the same strategies that undermine their satisfaction
— by seeking out more options, comparing more among
options, and dwelling more on options even after they have
given them up, maximizers incur the negative consequences
of choice overload (see, e.g., Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009; Iyen-
gar & Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz, 2004;
Schwartz et al., 2002). Additionally, Polman (2010) demon-
strated that maximizers achieve more outcomes in general,
such that, although maximizers achieve more positive out-
comes than satisficers, they also achieve more negative out-
comes (see also Parker et al., 2007). For example, by ap-
plying for more jobs than satisficers, maximizers increase
their odds of receiving both more rejections and more job
offers. However, because negative outcomes have a greater
influence on affect than positive outcomes (e.g., Rozin &
Royzman, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), maximizers
end up unhappier than satisficers despite some objectively
superior outcomes.
In some situations, maximizers may not experience
more post-decision regret and dissatisfaction than satisfi-
cers. Shiner (2015), for instance, recently showed that, al-
though maximizers are less satisfied than satisficers after
making irreversible decisions, they are actually more sat-
isfied than satisficers after reversible decisions, at least in
the short term. Contextual factors may therefore also play
an important role in determining maximizers’ negative out-
comes, an issue to which we return at the end of this review.
In sum, although maximizers may not always be less sat-
isfied with decisions than satisficers and may actually do
objectively better than satisficers in some cases, the general
impression that emerges from previous research using the
MS is that maximizers undermine their own well-being by
constantly striving to make the best choice. The maximiza-
tion literature, however, has recently experienced the rapid
introduction of almost a dozen new measures of maximiz-
ing, many of which define and measure maximizing quite
differently than Schwartz et al. (2002) did with the MS. As
a result, researchers have called into question claims about
the downside of maximizing, suggesting that, when defined
differently, maximizing need not be maladaptive, and may
even be adaptive. In the next section, we review and attempt
to clarify the literature on the measurement of maximizing,
with the goals of highlighting the shared and unique aspects
of the many measures and making explicit the distinct defi-
nitions of maximizing they assume.
3 Definitions and measures of maxi-
mization
Many of the conceptualizations and measures of maximiza-
tion that have emerged since Schwartz et al. (2002)’s initial
paper define maximization quite differently than the MS. In
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Table 1: Maximization conceptualizations and measures.
Authors Scale
Factors/
components
Definition of maximization
Simon (1955) ----- 2 The desire to optimize choice, achieved by searching
exhaustively through alternatives
Schwartz et al.
(2002)
Maximization Scale (MS) 1 The desire to get only the best, with the tendency to
search out and compare among alternatives and to find
decisions stressful
Nenkov et al. (2008) Short Form Maximization
Scale (MS-S)
3 Three distinct factors: having high standards, seeking
out and comparing among alternatives, and
experiencing decision difficulty
Diab et al. (2008) Maximizing Tendency Scale
(MTS)
1 “the general tendency to pursue the identification of the
optimal alternative” (p. 365)
Lai (2010) Modified Maximizing Scale
(MMS)
1 “hop[ing] to find the best possible solution by
systematically comparing available alternatives” (p.
164)
Turner et al. (2012) Maximization Inventory (MI) 3 Two distinct components: alternative search and
decision difficulty. Also introduced satisficing as a
distinct construct
Weinhardt et al.
(2012)
Revised Short Form
Maximization Scale (MS-S-R)
3 See Nenkov et al.
Weinhardt et al.
(2012)
Revised Maximizing Tendency
Scale (MTS-R)
3 Desiring the best option/having high standards
Mikkelson & Pauley
(2013)
Relational Maximization Scale
(RMS)
1 Same as Schwartz et al., but within the domain of
romantic partner choice
Richardson et al.
(2014)
Refined Maximization Scale
(MS-R)
3 Three distinct factors: wanting the best, experiencing
regret in decision making, and decision difficulty
Ma & Roese (2014) ----- 2 “a tendency to compare and the goal to get the best” (p.
71)
Dalal et al. (2015) 7-Item Maximizing Tendency
Scale-7 (MTS-7)
1 Being “unwilling to reduce [one’s’] standards when
making decisions” (p. 438)
Misuraca et al.
(2015)
Decision Making Tendency
Inventory (DMTI)
6 Two types of maximizing: resolute maximizing (having
high standards and seeking alternatives) and fearful
maximizing (experiencing decision difficulty and
comparing among alternatives). Also distinguished
between less ambitious and more ambitious satisficing
and parsimonious and indolent minimizing.
this section, we review the literature on the measurement
of maximization, briefly describing the 11 existing mea-
sures and attempting to clarify the similarities and differ-
ences among them (see Table 1 for a summary). To do so,
we focus mainly on the definitions guiding the development
and interpretation of the maximization scales, paying partic-
ular attention to questions of face validity.
In our view, a significant limitation of the maximization
measurement literature is that researchers have tended to
draw conclusions from empirical results, particularly psy-
chometric analyses, while neglecting or underweighting the
theoretical conceptualization of maximization that should,
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we believe, be the most important element in determining
how to measure maximization. Psychometric analyses such
as factor analysis are “a means to an end, the end being the
development of scales that further our understanding of the
construct they measure” (Briggs & Cheek, 1986, p. 112).
Previous research on the measurement of maximization has
perhaps risked using psychometric analyses as an end rather
than a means, with too little regard for construct validity
and maximization theory. As a result, we are confident
that many of the existing scales have adequate psychome-
tric properties. We are more concerned with their validity.
3.1 Maximization Scale (MS)
As mentioned earlier, Schwartz et al. (2002) developed the
Maximization Scale (MS) to measure individual differences
in the tendency to maximize. They based their conceptu-
alization of maximization on Simon’s (1955, 1956, 1957)
theory of bounded rationality, in which he defined maxi-
mization as both a goal and a strategy. According to Simon,
the goal of maximization is to make the best choice, which
is achieved by searching exhaustively through alternatives.
Although Simon may not have explicitly distinguished be-
tween the goal of choosing the best option and the strategy
used to achieve it, he did emphasize the importance of un-
derstanding “decisional processes” (Simon, 1955, p. 100)
and distinguished between the “economic man” (i.e., the
maximizer), who continues to seek out additional superior
alternatives even after encountering a high quality option,
and the (in his view more realistic) individual, who, as a
satisficer, stops searching for alternatives after encountering
one that is good enough to meet his standards. Thus, Simon
at least implicitly differentiated between choice goals and
choice processes or strategies.
Drawing on Simon’s theory, Schwartz et al. (2002) argued
that maximizers seek to make optimal choices, whereas sat-
isficers seek only to make choices that are good enough to
meet their standards. To distinguish between maximizers
and satisficers, the authors designed items for the MS in-
tended to reflect the tendency to seek the best (the items of
the MS and all other maximization measures are presented
in the Appendix). Some of these items related to having very
high standards (e.g., “I never settle for second best”), some
related to strategies used to find the optimal choice (e.g.,
“When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through
the available options even while attempting to watch one
program”), and others reflected difficulty or stress in the de-
cision making process (e.g., “I often find it difficult to shop
for a friend”).
To examine the factor structure of the 13-item MS,
Schwartz et al. (2002) conducted a principle component
analysis, which yielded three factors for the MS, as well as
a fourth factor consisting of five items designed to measure
the tendency to experience regret (which was conceptual-
ized as a distinct construct from maximization). These three
factors broadly reflected the three groups of items men-
tioned above; Schwartz et al. explicitly labeled one factor
high standards, which included items generally related to
wanting the best and having high standards for oneself. The
second factor included items broadly related to the tendency
to search for alternatives and to compare among alternatives
in order to find the best choice. The third factor included
items related to decision difficulty.
Although factor analysis suggested that the MS was
not unidimensional, Schwartz et al. (2002) used only to-
tal scores (i.e., the sum of the three factors) in their four
studies. Using the 13-item MS, Schwartz et al. found that
maximization predicted depression, regret, perfectionism,
decreased satisfaction with life, and was also negatively cor-
related with optimism and happiness. Based on these corre-
lations and the results of their other three studies, Schwartz
et al. concluded that maximizers are less happy and more de-
pressed than satisficers. Thus, although maximization may
have some benefits (e.g., attaining objectively better out-
comes; Iyengar et al., 2006; Polman, 2010), it also appeared
to be potentially maladaptive.
3.2 Short Form of the Maximization Scale
(MS-S)
The reliability of the MS in Schwartz et al.’s (2002) studies
was adequate (Cronbach’s alpha = .71), but concerns about
the reliability, validity, and factor structure of the scale per-
sisted, particularly due to the initial factor analysis conduced
by Schwartz et al. To examine these issues more closely,
Nenkov et al. (2008) conducted a series of analyses on data
from more than 5,000 participants who had completed the
13-item MS. They replicated the three-factor structure of
the MS, naming the three factors high standards, alternative
search, and decision difficulty. They also found that a six-
item short version, which contained two-item versions of the
three factors of the MS, had better psychometric properties
than the original 13-item version.
Additional analyses of the new short form of the Maxi-
mization Scale (MS-S) revealed the importance of examin-
ing each subscale separately, rather than simply summing
the three subscales to create one total maximization score.
Indeed, the alternative search factor predicted regret and was
negatively correlated with satisfaction with life, and the de-
cision difficulty factor also predicted regret and dissatisfac-
tion with life, as well as depression. In contrast, the high
standards factor appeared to be more adaptive: it was posi-
tively correlated with need for cognition, and, though it was
also positively correlated with perfectionism and regret, it
was unrelated to depression, happiness, or life satisfaction.
Thus, Nenkov et al. (2008) concluded that the maladaptive
aspects of maximization may be driven by the tendency to
search for and compare among alternatives and to experi-
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ence difficulty making decisions, whereas holding high stan-
dards may be less negative and even potentially positive.
They tempered this conclusion, however, by underlining the
need for more research on the definition of maximizing, sug-
gesting that it could be defined as a goal, a strategy, or both.
Hence, although they presented the three-factor MS-S, they
also acknowledged the possibility that one or more of the
three factors might not fit with future conceptualizations of
maximization.
3.3 Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS)
Diab, Gillespie, and Highhouse (2008) subsequently criti-
cized the MS for not being unidimensional; they argued that
maximization was a unitary construct involving “the general
tendency to pursue the identification of the optimal alterna-
tive” (p. 365). With this definition in mind, they constructed
the Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS), a new scale de-
signed to be unidimensional. The MTS includes items re-
lated to having high standards (e.g., “I never settle”) and the
desire to know about and compare as many alternatives as
possible (e.g., “I am uncomfortable making decisions before
I know all of my options”).
In line with Nenkov et al.’s (2008) finding that having
high standards may not be maladaptive, Diab et al. (2008)
found that the MTS, which mostly emphasizes having high
standards, was positively correlated only with regret and
was unrelated to life satisfaction, whereas the MS was pos-
itively correlated with neuroticism and indecision, and was
negatively correlated with life satisfaction. The authors thus
concluded that maximization is a unidimensional construct
and that, when defined as the tendency to seek the optimal
alternative, it is not necessarily maladaptive.
It is worth noting, however, that, although Diab et al.
(2008) claimed to be measuring maximization as one uni-
dimensional construct, their scale actually contains two po-
tentially related but nonetheless distinct tendencies — the
tendency to want the best or to have high standards, and the
tendency to seek out alternatives. Therefore, the MTS can
be seen as including both the high standards and alternative
search aspects of maximization as defined by the MS and
MS-S, though with a greater emphasis on the former con-
struct. Where the MTS most differs from the MS and MS-S,
then, is in its elimination of decision difficulty as a facet of
maximization.
3.4 Revised Short Form of the Maximization
Scale (MS-S-R) and Revised Maximizing
Tendency Scale (MTS-R)
In a subsequent study, Weinhardt, Morse, Chimeli and
Fisher (2012) further investigated the structure of the MS
and the MTS, ultimately deciding, based on item response
theory and factor analyses, that both scales were psychome-
trically flawed. In particular, they noted that both scales had
questionable reliability and that neither appeared to have a
unidimensional structure. With regard to the MS, this con-
clusion is not surprising; indeed, Nenkov et al. (2008) had
already suggested that researchers should separately exam-
ine the three subscales of the six-item MS-S instead of sum-
ming the 13 items from the MS into a total maximization
score. Weinhardt et al. refined the MS into a Revised Short
Form of the Maximization Scale (MS-S-R), which, although
it did not contain the exact same items as the MS-S, did con-
tain three separate factors that were conceptually identical to
the high standards, alternative search, and decision difficulty
factors of the MS-S.
In contrast, that Weinhardt et al. (2012) found that the
MTS did not appear to be unidimensional is somewhat sur-
prising because it directly clashes with the main goal of Diab
et al. (2008) in the design of the MTS. As noted above,
however, the original MTS contained items that appeared
to reflect both high standards and the tendency to seek al-
ternatives, which may explain why its factor structure di-
verged from Diab et al.’s goal. Weinhardt et al. created a
Revised Maximization Tendency Scale (MTS-R) by remov-
ing the three items that were both the most problematic and
the most related to the alternative search construct. The
MTS-R thus focuses even more specifically than the MTS
on having high standards. Weinhardt et al. concluded their
analyses with the suggestion that the MTS-R be used for fu-
ture research, arguing that it best reflected the maximization
construct. Hence, Weinhardt et al. narrowed the definition
of maximization even more than Diab et al.; whereas the
latter’s definition includes some tendency to desire and seek
out alternatives in addition to having high standards, the for-
mer’s definition focuses exclusively having high standards.
3.5 7-Item Maximizing Tendency Scale
(MTS-7)
In response to questions about the content and reliability of
the MTS, Dalal, Diab, Zhu and Hwang (2015) re-examined
the psychometric properties of the MTS. Based on the re-
sults of factor and item response theory analyses, Dalal et
al. removed two of the items from the MTS to create the
7-Item Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS-7). The two re-
moved items, which were two of the three items that Wein-
hardt et al. (2012) had also removed to create the MTS-R,
are the two that most reflect the alternative search construct.
Accordingly, like the MTS-R, the MTS-7 narrows the def-
inition of maximization to solely include having high stan-
dards. Note that the MTS-R and MTS-7 are therefore nearly
identical; the only difference is that the MTS-7 contains the
additional item “No matter what it takes, I always try to
choose the best thing,” which fits with the goal of choosing
the optimal outcome typically included in the high standards
construct.
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3.6 Modified Maximizing Scale (MMS)
A similar approach to that of Diab et al. (2008) was taken by
Lai (2010), who developed a Modified Maximizing Scale
(MMS) intended to measure maximizing without decision
difficulty. As a result, her scale showed similar patterns of
correlations as the MTS: it was positively correlated with
regret, need for cognition, and optimism, and was unrelated
to an item intended to measure decision difficulty. Thus,
Lai, like Diab et al., concluded that the definition of maxi-
mization involved the pursuit of the best alternative but not
decision difficulty, and that maximizing may therefore not
carry all of the negative implications suggested by Schwartz
et al. (2002).
3.7 Maximization Inventory (MI)
In another series of studies on maximizing, Rim, Turner,
Betz and Nygren (2011) and Turner, Rim, Betz and Nygren
(2012) took a quite different approach to the conceptualiza-
tion and measurement of maximization. Based on factor
analyses and item response theory analyses, Rim et al. drew
two central conclusions. First, they concluded that both
the MS and the MTS had serious psychometric weaknesses.
Second, they argued that high standards should not be in-
cluded in the definition of maximization; rather, alternative
search and decision difficulty together comprise maximiza-
tion. This latter argument arose from analyses that showed
that both the MTS (which emphasizes high standards) and
the high standards subscale of the MS were not only weakly
related to the decision difficulty and alternative search di-
mensions of theMS, but also showed a very different— and,
in line with the findings of Diab et al. (2008) and Lai (2010),
more adaptive — pattern of correlations than the alternative
search and decision difficulty factors. Because the tendency
to have high standards appears to be positively related to
well-being while alternative search and decision difficulty
are negatively related to well-being, Rim et al. suggested
that high standards cannot be a component of maximization.
Building on Rim et al. (2011), Turner et al. (2012) con-
structed the Maximization Inventory (MI), an entirely new
measure that includes three distinct factors that are not
summed to create a total score. Two of these factors are al-
ternative search and decision difficulty, which conceptually
mirror the two factors of the same name in the MS-S. The
third dimension of the MI is satisficing, which Turner et al.
presented as a unique and previously unstudied element in
maximization research. They defined satisficing as an adap-
tive behavior associated with making choices that meet a
person’s standards but do not have to be the best. Consistent
with their theory, the satisficing scale was positively corre-
lated with happiness, optimism, self-efficacy, and an adap-
tive decision making style, whereas the decision difficulty
scale was negatively correlated with happiness, optimism,
and self-efficacy, and the alternative search scale was un-
related to these measures. Thus, Turner et al. introduced a
new definition of maximization that includes the tendency to
search for and compare among alternatives and the tendency
to experience decision difficulty, but that does not include
high standards or an inherent tendency to desire the best
(only the second of which potentially distinguishes maxi-
mizers, as satisficers can also have quite high standards).
Furthermore, by defining satisficing as a new and distinct
construct, the authors explicitly rejected the conceptualiza-
tion of maximizing and satisficing as two ends of the same
continuum.
It is somewhat surprising that Turner et al.’s (2012) defi-
nition of maximization excludes the desire for the best, be-
cause, at least according to the original theories (e.g., Diab
et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2002; Simon, 1955, 1956),
maximizing is, first and foremost, a tendency to want to get
the best outcome or to optimize decision making. Indeed,
the very term maximize means to make the best of, and thus
it is somewhat unclear what maximization as a construct can
be if it does not include the goal of optimization or the strat-
egy used to optimize choices. Moreover, Rim et al.’s (2011)
and Turner et al.’s exclusion of a high standards component
of maximization is largely based on psychometric analyses;
they argued that it showed a very distinct pattern of corre-
lations with other measures compared to alternative search
and decision difficulty dimensions in addition to being unre-
lated to the latter two dimensions. However, from a theoret-
ical standpoint, it seems essential to include a desire for the
best in any definition of maximization, and it is also possible
that the goal of maximization, independent of the strategy of
alternative search or the experience of decision difficulty, is
not particularly maladaptive. In other words, that the high
standards factor of the MS and the total score of the MTS
were psychometrically distinct from other factors of maxi-
mization need not signal that they do not belong in the study
of maximization; rather, it may just be that maximization is
a multidimensional construct that can be potentially adap-
tive or maladaptive (as we argue later).
In addition, it is somewhat unclear whether the MI’s satis-
ficing items clearly map onto Turner et al.’s definition of sat-
isficing. Some of the items appear to reflect a “make the best
of the situation” approach to decisions (e.g., “Good things
happen even when things don’t go right at first” and “In life
I try to make the most of whatever path I take”), whereas
others seem more related to tolerance of uncertainty (e.g., “I
accept that life often has uncertainty” and “I can’t possibly
know everything before making a decision”; see, e.g., Free-
ston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas & Ladouceur, 1994). Thus,
the theoretical conceptualization of satisficing may not nec-
essarily be accurately reflected in the MI’s satisficing items.
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3.8 Refined Maximization Scale (MS-R)
Recently, a series of studies by Richardson, Ye, Ege, Suh
and Rice (2014) provided further investigations of the na-
ture and measurement of maximization. Richardson et al.
reexamined the original 13-item MS along with the five-
item Regret Scale also constructed by Schwartz et al. (2002).
Richardson et al. had two primary goals: first, they sought
to examine the factor structure of the MS, and second, they
aimed to create a measure of maximization that possessed
gender invariance, given that previous studies of the MS
sometimes showed men scoring higher than women and
sometimes showed no gender difference (e.g., Schwartz et
al., 2002, Study 1). They conducted a series of exploratory
factor analyses on the items from the MS and Regret Scale
combined with several new items, which ultimately yielded
three factors that they labeled want the best, regret, and de-
cision difficulty. Together, the best items of each of these
three factors formed a new 10-item Refined Maximization
Scale (MS-R). From a conceptual standpoint, the want the
best factor largely mirrors the high standards subscale of
the MS-S and MS-S-R, the MTS, MTS-R, MTS-7, and the
MMS; it is conceptually similar to these previous scales
and also shows similar patterns of correlations with other
measures (e.g., it is negatively related to depression). The
other two factors identified by Richardson et al., however,
diverge somewhat from previous research. The regret factor
includes items from the Regret Scale and also items previ-
ously considered part of the decision difficulty factor of the
MS, while the decision difficulty factor is mostly a mix of
items from the alternative search and decision difficulty fac-
tors of the MS. The authors concluded that the MS-R has
superior reliability and validity to the original MS and suc-
cessfully demonstrates gender invariance.
Although the MS-R might have acceptable reliability, the
inclusion of the five Regret Scale items from Schwartz et
al. (2002) may not be the most valid way to measure max-
imization, at least as it has been typically defined. Regret
is typically considered to be an outcome of maximizing ten-
dencies (e.g., Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2002; Zeelen-
berg & Pieters, 2007) rather than a component comprising
the construct of maximization, and fear of regret may also
be one cause of maximization (e.g., individuals may believe
that making the best choice will prevent regret; see, e.g.,
Schwartz et al, 2002). Hence, combining regret and max-
imization into one construct impedes research on both the
outcomes and the causes of maximization. Richardson et
al.’s (2014) definition of maximization as a three-part con-
struct made up of a tendency to experience regret, a desire
for the best, and the experience of decision difficulty thus
diverges somewhat from previous conceptualizations. That
said, the latter two components fit conceptually with the sug-
gestions of Nenkov et al. (2008), though the decision dif-
ficulty factor of the MS-R borders on conflating alternative
search and decision difficulty by combining items from both
factors in the MS. It is therefore the regret component that
most distinguishes Richardson et al.’s view of maximization.
3.9 Decision Making Tendency Inventory
(DMTI)
Even more recently, Misuraca, Faraci, Gangemi, Carmeci
and Miceli (2015) took a new approach to the conceptu-
alization and measurement of maximization. They con-
structed the Decision Making Tendency Inventory (DMTI)
to achieve three goals. First, they sought to reduce the con-
fusion in the maximization literature by designing a new
maximization scale. Second, they questioned the construct
validity of the satisficing scale of the MI and aimed to cre-
ate a new, more valid satisficing measure. Third, they in-
troduced a novel construct labeled minimizing, which they
defined as “the tendency to minimize the amount of re-
sources in order to get the minimum of the possible re-
sults. . .Minimizers settle for mediocrity. . . and choose the
option that meets the absolute minimum” (p. 112). To cre-
ate the DMTI, Misuraca et al. drew some items from the
MS and MTS and also created several new items, and fac-
tor analyses yielded a six-factor structure which, according
to the authors’ interpretation, comprised two maximizing
scales, two satisficing scales, and two minimizing scales.
Misuraca et al. (2015) labeled the first maximizing scale
resolute maximizing and the second maximizing scale fear-
ful maximizing. Despite these new names, the two scales
map fairly well onto existing constructs in the maximiza-
tion literature. Specifically, the resolute maximizing scale
consists mostly of items reflecting high standards (“I never
settle for second best,” “No matter what I do, I always set the
highest standards,” and “I never settle”), with one item from
the MS reflecting alternative search (“No matter how satis-
fied I am with my job, it is only right for me to be on the
lookout for better opportunities”). On the other hand, the
fearful maximizing scale largely mirrors previous decision
difficulty scales, and includes decision difficulty items from
the MS (e.g., “Renting videos is really difficult. I am al-
ways struggling to pick the best one”). The two maximizing
scales hence largely reflect high standards and decision dif-
ficulty, with the alternative search construct somewhat split
between them.
With regard to the two satisficing scales, Misuraca et al.
(2015) labeled the first less ambitious satisficing and the sec-
ond more ambitious satisficing. The former scale — con-
sisting of items such as “In choosing between alternatives, I
stop at the first that works for me” and “When I watch TV
or listen to the radio, I tend to follow the first program that
I find interesting” — fits well with the definition of satisfic-
ing offered by Turner et al. (2012), and may in this respect
capture the tendency to make choices that successfully meet
personal standards and goals without needing to choose the
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best option better than the MI satisficing subscale. The
more ambitious satisficing subscale, however, more closely
reflects the tendency to make choices that satisfy, as op-
posed to compromising before an option that meets one’s
standards has been encountered (e.g., “When I make de-
cisions, I spend the time required to choose an alternative
that is satisfactory to me”). A limitation of this scale is that
it may not adequately distinguish between maximizers and
satisficers, because maximizers and satisficers both continue
searching until they find something that meets their goals;
it just happens that maximizers are only satisfied with the
best. Moreover, even minimizers might endorse the more
ambitious satisficing items, because they too do not stop
until they find a satisfying result — the difference is that,
for minimizers, the satisfying result is any result that min-
imally suffices. Thus, the more ambitious satisficing sub-
scale may reflect general perseverance more than satisficing
per se, whereas the less ambitious satisficing subscale may
better reflect typical definitions of satisficing.
Finally, Misuraca et al. (2015) distinguished between par-
simonious minimizers, who seek to spend the least amount
of money when making consumer purchases (e.g., “When
I buy something, I seek only the cheapest product”), and
indolent minimizers, who seek to expend as little effort as
possible (e.g., “I always set targets to be achieved with min-
imal effort”). The latter type of minimizing is more re-
lated to decision making processes and strategies, and there-
fore more easily comparable to satisficing and maximizing,
whereas parsimonious minimizing is more narrowly focused
on spending within a consumer purchasing context. Such a
focused tendency is more domain-specific than the major-
ity of previous maximizing scales, and may thus predict a
more limited — but not necessarily less important — range
of behaviors.3
3.10 Relational Maximization Scale (RMS)
With the exception of the DMTI, the scales discussed thus
far have all approached the measurement of maximization
from a domain-general perspective (though some contain
items with domain-specific examples of behavior), attempt-
ing to assess the general tendency to maximize across many
domains. In contrast to this approach, Mikkelson and Pauley
(2013) recently constructed the Relational Maximization
Scale (RMS), which is intended to measure maximizing
specifically within the domain of romantic relationships.
Mikkelson and Pauley built upon Schwartz et al.’s (2002)
original MS to design the RMS with a three-factor structure
comprised of relational high standards (e.g., “I won’t set-
tle for second best in my romantic relationships”), relational
alternative search (e.g., “I constantly compare my current
3As Misuraca et al. (2015) noted, parsimonious minimizers seem quite
similar to tightwads as defined by Rick, Cryder and Loewenstein (2008),
as both try hard to spend as little money as possible.
relationship to other potential relationships”), and relational
decision difficulty (e.g., “I have a hard time choosing a re-
lational partner”), and the authors also followed Schwartz
et al.’s initial analytic strategy by summing the three factors
into one relational maximizing score (rather than examin-
ing the three factors separately). Consistent with previous
research employing the MS, Mikkelson and Pauley found
that RMS scores predicted lower relationship satisfaction
and lower relationship investment. Thus, the RMS applies
Schwartz et al.’s definition of maximization to the context of
decision making about romantic partners.
3.11 Maximizing Mind-Set
One final view of maximization merits review, though its
introduction did not coincide with the construction of a new
individual difference measure. Ma and Roese (2014) con-
ducted a series of studies in which they attempted to experi-
mentally prime a maximizing mind-set, which was “concep-
tualized in terms of two key features: a tendency to compare
and the goal to get the best” (p. 71).4 This definition essen-
tially mirrors that of Simon (1955), and also fits with the
MTS and the MMS designed by Diab et al. (2008) and Lai
(2010), respectively. The two features also map more or less
onto the alternative search and high standards factors of the
MS-S and MS-S-R. Importantly, however, Ma and Roese’s
definition of maximization does not include decision diffi-
culty, and thus differs from Schwartz et al.’s (2002) origi-
nal work, though Ma and Roese’s findings that inducing a
maximizing mind-set increases regret, dissatisfaction, and
the likelihood of returning or switching chosen products are
largely consistent with the findings of Schwartz et al. and
others who included decision difficulty in their conceptual-
izations of maximization.
3.12 Summary
In sum, several different conceptualizations of maximiza-
tion as an individual difference have emerged in the years
since Schwartz et al.’s (2002) original article. Nenkov et
al. (2008) showed that the original MS implicitly concep-
tualized maximization as the combination of the desire for
the best (i.e., “high standards”), the tendency to seek out
and compare among alternatives (i.e., “alternative search”),
and the tendency to experience difficulty and stress while
making decisions (i.e., “decision difficulty”), and created
the MS-S, which comprises a high standards subscale, an
alternative search subscale, and a decision difficulty sub-
scale. Subsequent researchers designed scales that empha-
sized high standards and alternative search without decision
difficulty (the MTS and the MMS), only high standards (the
4For another example of the use of this priming procedure, see Mao
(2016).
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Figure 1: A two-component model of maximization.
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MTS-R and MTS-7), or alternative search and decision dif-
ficulty without high standards (the MI). Other researchers
(Misuraca et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2012) argued that satis-
ficing should be conceptualized as a unique construct, rather
than as low scores on maximization scales, and created sep-
arate satisficing scales (the MI and DMTI). Furthermore,
with the MS-R, Richardson et al. (2014) included regret in
their definition and measurement of maximization, and Mis-
uraca et al. (2015) introduced the novel concept of minimiz-
ing with their DMTI. Thus, the 11 published measures of
maximization offer several different, conflicting conceptual-
izations of maximization, and at least six separate constructs
— high standards, alternative search, decision difficulty, sat-
isficing, regret, and minimizing— have emerged as possible
components that make up or are related to maximization.
Despite the many contributions of different authors, a
substantial weakness of the extant literature is that much
of the theorizing about maximization has followed, rather
than preceded, scale development and analysis. As a result,
imperfect definitions of maximization — such as maximiza-
tion without a desire to make the best choice — fit existing
scales, but they do not necessarily make theoretical sense,
and they clash with Simon’s initial theory. In the next sec-
tion, we propose a model of maximization that integrates
previous empirical and theoretical work in an attempt to be-
gin clarifying the past, present, and future of research on
individual differences in maximization.
4 A two-component model of maxi-
mization
We propose that maximization may be best understood as
a two-part construct. Figure 1 presents a two-component
model of maximization, which delineates the two proposed
components: the maximization goal and the maximization
strategy. The first component is the maximization goal of
choosing the best, which is the goal of optimizing decision
making by making the best choice, as highlighted by Si-
mon (1955). With regard to existing theories of maximiza-
tion, the goal component largely reflects the high standards
aspect of maximization included in the MS, MS-S, MTS,
MMS, MS-S-R, MTS-R, MTS-7, RMS, and DMTI and the
want the best factor of the MS-R. As discussed above, this
goal is not included in the MI, nor do Rim et al. (2011) and
Turner et al. (2012) believe it should be part of the defini-
tion of maximization. Nonetheless, following virtually all
other authors, we argue that the goal of choosing the best is
an important aspect of maximization; indeed, it may be the
more central — almost definitional— component.
Although the maximization goal is quite similar to the
high standards factor in many scales, there is an impor-
tant clarification to be made between simply having high
standards and actually desiring the best. Theoretically, it
seems plausible that many people could have high standards
without feeling the need to find the absolute best choice —
rather, they may simply search until they find an adequate
option that meets their standards and then select that option.
In fact, they may be happy to choose the first option that fits
their criteria, which would, in effect, make them satisficers.
Thus, it is not actually having high standards that defines
the goal of maximization, but rather desiring the best as op-
posed to other sub-optimal but still potentially high-quality
alternatives.5
This distinction is particularly relevant to maximization
as conceived by Dalal et al. (2015), who argued that it “is
most appropriate. . . to define maximizers as individuals who
are unwilling to reduce their standards when making deci-
sions” (p. 438) and that “maximizers differ from satisficers
based on having high standards. . . the only thing that dis-
tinguishes maximizers from satisficers is the standards they
keep” (p. 447). In our view, having high standards need
not distinguish satisficers and maximizers — in some cases,
they may have identical standards.6 The desire for the best is
5More formally, Simon (1956) used the following characteristic to de-
scribe a satisficing organism: “If all its needs are met, it simply becomes in-
active” (p. 136). Thus, satisficers may have high or low standards, but once
their standards are met, they stop searching for additional options. There
is no theoretical reason why maximizers must have higher standards than
satisficers; it is how they behave when they encounter a sub-optimal option
that meets these standards that distinguishes them. Critically, seeking the
best uniquely demands an exhaustive search of the options. All other goals,
no matter how high the standards, yield searches that stop when the desired
standard is met.
6For instance, Simon (1955) discusses the example of someone selling
a house (pp. 104–105). A satisficer, he argued, determines an acceptable
price, and then labels “anything over this amount as ‘satisfactory,’ any-
thing less as ‘unsatisfactory’” (p. 104). The acceptance price, however,
can be higher or lower depending on the satisficer; i.e., the satisficer could
have higher or lower standards for what is an acceptable price. The im-
portant point is that the satisficer will accept the first acceptable price and
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the key distinction: satisficers will stop searching once their
standards — however high they may be — are met, whereas
maximizers may continue searching for a better option even
after they have found one that would potentially meet their
standards.7 Because of the theoretical importance of this
distinction, we define the maximization goal as the goal of
choosing the best, rather than use the misleading label “high
standards,” which does not accurately describe an attribute
exclusive to maximizers.
The second component of our model is the maximiza-
tion strategy of alternative search, which is the strategy of
seeking out alternatives and comparing them. The MS-S,
MS-S-R, MI, and RMS include alternative search as a com-
ponent of maximization, and the MS, MTS, MMS, MS-R,
and DMTI also include items that reflect alternative search.
Simon’s (1955) original conceptualization of maximization
included both a goal and a strategy, and there has been some
tendency in previous research to combine the two into a sin-
gle component of maximization.8 For instance, the MTS in-
cludes items that reflect the goal of maximization and others
that reflect the desire to know about alternatives (see Wein-
hardt, et al., 2012), and thus a two-component model helps
distinguish between these two related, but nonetheless dis-
tinct facets of maximization.
Our definition of the maximization strategy combines the
process of seeking out alternatives, including the act of seek-
ing out information about alternatives, with the process of
comparing alternatives. The process of seeking out alter-
natives may be more relevant in situations with many op-
tions; with only a few options, the processes of seeking
out more information about the available options and ex-
tensively comparing among them may be more relevant.
For instance, a maximizer may identify all possible options
quickly, but then spend a large amount of time trying to eval-
uate the tradeoffs of the choice alternatives. A satisficer,
stop considering additional offers. Expanding on Simon’s argument, we
suggest that a maximizer, in contrast, will continue considering alternative
offers with the goal of findings the best offer even after receiving an offer
above the acceptable price. Indeed, the maximizer may not even have an
“acceptable price.” Instead, the highest price becomes the acceptable price.
And a satisficer could have higher standards than a maximizer. Suppose
the satisficer wants to get at least $500,000 for the house whereas the max-
imizer wants the highest (i.e., best) offer. The best offer that comes in is for
$475,000. The maximizer sells the house and the satisficer takes it off the
market.
7Of course, is may often be impossible for maximizers to identify, much
less choose, the best option (indeed, this was one of Simon’s central argu-
ments), but we emphasize that they have the goal of choosing the best, even
if this is impossible and they eventually choose a sub-optimal alternative.
Indeed, it is this impossibility that may make maximizing so potentially
detrimental to well-being (Schwartz, 2000, 2004, 2010; Schwartz et al.,
2002).
8In theorizing about satisficing, Simon (1956) distinguished between
“goals” and “means” (see, e.g., pp. 130–131), which highlights the im-
portance of conceptualizing the maximization goal and the maximization
strategy as separate components of maximization. The maximization strat-
egy of alternative search can be seen as the “means” by which maximizers
seek to achieve the maximization goal of choosing the best option.
on the other hand, would stop considering tradeoffs once
a suitable option has been identified. Thus, in our view, the
maximization strategy extends beyond the act of seeking out
alternatives to include comparison and information-seeking
processes as well. Future research, however, may benefit
from further distinguishing between these different facets of
the maximization strategy.
Drawing from research on goals and strategies as mid-
level personality constructs (for a recent review, see Norem,
2012), we emphasize that to be a maximizer, an individ-
ual must pursue the goal of choosing the best through the
strategy of alternative search, as opposed to through the
use of other strategies. For example, although the desire
to make the best choice often leads to extensive comparison
among alternatives (e.g., Swan, 1969), an individual pursu-
ing the maximization goal could instead consult online re-
views of products by other consumers (e.g., Smith, Menon
& Sivakumar, 2005), simply choose the highest rated prod-
uct in Consumer Reports, or even think about other things
while waiting for the best choice to reveal itself (e.g., Giblin,
Morewedge & Norton, 2013). In each of these cases, this in-
dividual would not be a maximizer, because maximization
is the combination of the desire for the best option and the
strategy of seeking out and comparing alternatives. The two-
component model’s differentiation between the maximiza-
tion goal and the maximization strategy thus follows from
the larger literature on personality and motivation that high-
lights the importance of both personal goals and cognitive-
behavioral strategies adopted to achieve goals as separate
but potentially related constructs (e.g., Cantor, 1990; Em-
mons, 1986; Klinger & Cox, 2004; Little, 2015; Norem,
1989). Although Schwartz et al. (2002) did not articulate the
maximization goal and strategy in these terms, their scale
did include items reflecting both a goal and a strategy; in
other words, the combination of the goal and strategy com-
ponents of maximization was implicitly included in their ini-
tial conceptualization of maximization (though they also in-
cluded items reflecting decision difficulty in their scale).
With regard to the strategy component of our model, it is
worth noting that Dalal et al. (2015) explicitly excluded the
alternative search strategy from their conceptualization of
maximization (for a related argument, see also Weinhardt,
et al., 2012). They argued that alternative search, as de-
fined and measured by Nenkov et al.’s (2008) MS-S, actu-
ally reflects a rational decision making style, as measured by
the rational decision making subscale of Scott and Bruce’s
(1995) General Decision-Making Style (GDMS) measure.
Despite this argument, Dalal et al.’s hypothesis that the al-
ternative search subscale of the MS-S would be more related
to a rational decision making style than other measures of
maximization was not supported by the results of their study.
However, this null result may be explained by the fact that,
although Scott and Bruce defined a rational decision mak-
ing style as “a thorough search for and logical evaluation of
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alternatives” (p. 820), the items of the rational decision mak-
ing style subscale seem to more close reflect a tendency to
think carefully and deliberately about decisions than a ten-
dency to search for and compare among alternatives (e.g., “I
double-check my information sources to be sure I have the
right facts before making decisions”; “My decision making
requires careful thought”; “I make decisions in a logical and
systematic way”).9 Thus, it may be true that the alternative
search subscale of the MS-S reflects Scott and Bruce’s defi-
nition of a rational decision making style; it may just be that
the rational decision making style subscale of the GDMS
mostly measures careful thinking and deliberative process-
ing of information during decision making, rather than any
specific mode of alternative search.
Importantly, however, Scott and Bruce’s (1995) concep-
tualization of rational decision making as the tendency to
seek out and compare alternatives derives from the same
theoretical source as Simon’s (1955, 1956, 1957) work on
satisficing — namely, rational choice theory. That is, the
alternative search strategy is what would be considered “ra-
tional” according to traditional economic theorizing. Ac-
cordingly, Dalal et al.’s (2015) apparent re-definition of the
alternative search construct does not actually clash with Si-
mon’s definition of maximizing; indeed, suggesting that al-
ternative search reflects rational choice theory’s definition
of a “rational” choice strategy is actually an argument in fa-
vor of including alternative search in the conceptualization
of maximization.10
An important goal of our model of maximization is to
more clearly distinguish between components of maximiza-
tion and causes and outcomes of maximization. Several ex-
isting measures and definitions of maximization include ei-
ther or both decision difficulty and regret, but both of these
are often considered — and, in our view, should be consid-
ered — to be consequences or causes, rather than compo-
nents, of maximization (e.g., Dalal et al., 2015; Lai, 2010;
9Scott and Bruce’s (1995) definition of rational decision making also
appears to relate to the reasoning and decision making style of actively
open-minded thinking (see, e.g., Baron, 1993, and scale items in Haran, Ri-
tov & Mellers, 2013), which is characterized by the tendency to spend time
carefully considering options and alternatives when reasoning or making
a decision. Thinking actively and carefully considering additional alterna-
tives can lead to superior outcomes when done in moderation, but searching
for too many alternatives may undermine decision making. An interesting
direction for future research may be to consider how maximizers’ tendency
to seek out as many alternatives as possible represents an instance of hav-
ing “too much of a good thing” (e.g., Grant & Schwartz, 2011). Whereas
some alternative search is helpful in decision making, extensive alternative
search may undermine decision making rather than improving it further.
10Implicit in Dalal et al.’s (2015) argument seems to be the assumption
that because a choice strategy is labeled “rational”, it cannot be part of
maximization. Yet, Simon’s arguments focused on critiquing the view of
maximization as the supposedly “rational” approach to decision making.
And since Simon’s critique, modern researchers have continued to debate
and reconsider the supposed rationality of the maximization strategy and
other facets of rational choice theory (see, e.g., Baron, 1985; Byron, 2004;
Schwartz, Ben-Haim & Dacso, 2011). Whether or not a behavior is “ratio-
nal” should not determine what constitutes maximization.
Rassin, 2007; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2002; Zee-
lenberg & Pieters, 2007).11 Since Schwartz et al.’s (2002)
initial study, much of the interest in maximization as an in-
dividual difference has focused on the potential outcomes of
maximization, but including outcomes in the definition of a
construct, as maximization scales that measure decision dif-
ficulty and regret do, impedes the study of consequences of
a construct. A two-component model will therefore facili-
tate future research by clarifying the distinction between the
goal and strategy that together comprise maximization, on
one hand, and causes and outcomes of maximization such
as regret and decision difficulty, on the other.
5 Implications and future directions
5.1 Measuring maximization
Having attempted to clarify research on maximization by re-
viewing previous definitions and measures and proposing an
integrative two-component model, we now address the ques-
tion of how researchers should measure maximization. Ac-
cording to our model, researchers should measure the max-
imization goal of choosing the best and the maximization
strategy of alternative search. In our view, the best measure
of the goal of choosing the best is Dalal et al.’s (2015) MTS-
7, which follows Diab et al.’s (2008) MTS in its emphasis on
the desire to make the best choice, but also refines the MTS
by eliminating two items that reflect alternative search more
than the goal of choosing the best. TheMTS-7 is also prefer-
able to the high standards subscale of Nenkov et al.’s (2008)
MS-S because the MTS-7 has more items and thus superior
psychometric properties.
Of the existing measures, the two that most specifically
seek to measure the maximization strategy are the alterna-
tive search subscale of the MS-S and the alternative search
scale of Turner et al.’s (2012) MI. The alternative search
subscale of the MS-S is only two-items long and contains
at least one potentially outdated item (“When I am in the car
listening to the radio, I often check out other stations to see
if something better is playing, even if I am relatively satis-
fied with what I’m listening to”). In contrast, the alternative
search scale of the MI is longer, but may not as closely re-
flect the maximization strategy, as some of its items appear
related to other behaviors beyond alternative search (e.g.,
“When I see something that I want, I always try to find the
11One possible reason why previous researchers have included decision
difficulty in their conceptualizations of maximization is that Simon argued
that decision difficulty would be a logical outcome of attempting to maxi-
mize utility with limited time and finite cognitive resources. Simon did not
consider individual differences; therefore, individual variation in decision
difficulty does not necessarily fit with a strict interpretation of his argu-
ments. However, in our view, failing to distinguish between maximization
and decision difficulty undermines research on moderators of the effects of
maximization and ignores the fact that, theoretically, there are some situa-
tions in which maximization need not cause any decision difficulty.
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best deal before purchasing it”; “I usually continue to search
for an item until it reaches my expectations”; I just won’t
make a decision until I am comfortable with the process”).
Thus, for now, we tentatively recommend the use of the al-
ternative search subscale of the MI, though we also encour-
age future researchers to continue to consider and refine the
measurement of the maximization strategy.
An open question for maximization research concerns
the conceptualization of satisficing. Although some au-
thors have cautioned against assuming that satisficing and
maximizing are two ends of the same continuum, much
of previous research nonetheless defines satisficing as the
opposite of maximizing — or, more specifically, as low
scores on maximization scales (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2002;
Diab et al., 2008). Turner et al. (2012) broke from this
pattern by including a satisficing scale in their MI, which
they argued was a separate construct. As mentioned above,
however, some of the MI’s satisficing items seem more
related to tolerance for uncertainty and a “make the best
of the situation” approach to decisions. Furthermore, re-
searchers have questioned its incremental validity (Moyano-
Díaz, Martínez-Molina, & Ponce, 2014) and reliability
(Dewberry, Juanchich & Narendran, 2013).
Following Turner et al. (2012), Misuraca et al. (2015)
similarly conceptualized satisficing as a separate construct
from maximizing, and further distinguished between less
ambitious satisficing and more ambitious satisficing. Al-
though the DMTI’s more ambitious satisficing scale appears
to reflect a tendency to persevere more than a tendency to
satisfice, the less ambitious satisficing scale does appear to
fit well with a definition of satisficing as the tendency to
choose the first option that meets one’s criteria when mak-
ing a choice. Thus, the DMTI’s less ambitious satisficing
scale may be the most appropriate satisficing scale for fu-
ture research, though more research may be needed to fur-
ther develop the concept of satisficing (e.g., Moyano-Díaz
et al., 2014).
5.2 Situational and personality moderators
An important direction for future research is to investigate
moderators of maximization’s consequences — both within
and outside the individual chooser — in addition to sim-
ply looking at the main effects of maximization on deci-
sion satisfaction and well-being. (For a similar argument
with regard to decision making research in general, see Ap-
pelt, Milch, Handgraaf & Weber, 2011.) Indeed, previous
research has highlighted contextual factors such as the re-
versibility of choices (Shiner, 2015) or the number of op-
tions in a choice set (e.g., Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009), as well
as individual differences such as consumer product knowl-
edge (Karimi, Papamichail & Holland, 2015), as important
potential moderators of the influence of maximization on
post-decision satisfaction, yet the majority of existing stud-
ies compare maximizers and satisficers without considering
additional factors. Thus, considering how other individual
differences (e.g., decision making competence; Bruine de
Bruin et al., 2007) and contextual factors interact with the
maximization goal and strategy should be an important ob-
jective for future research.
One possible approach to the study of moderators of max-
imization is to study the moderating role of maximization
ability — that is, the feasibility of actually finding the op-
timal option when making a choice, which may depend on
both individual differences such as decision competence and
working memory capacity and situational variables such as
choice set size and time pressure. Including maximization
ability as a moderator may, for instance, help further clarify
the relation between maximization and decision difficulty.
As noted above, several authors included decision difficulty
as a factor in their measures of maximization (Nenkov et al.,
2008; Schwartz et al., 2002; Richardson et al., 2014; Turner
et al., 2012), whereas others have argued that the construct
of maximization does not inherently include the tendency to
find decisions difficult or stressful (Dalal et al., 2015; Diab
et al., 2008; Lai, 2010; Weinhardt et al., 2012). We agree
that decision difficulty is an outcome of maximization, and
considering maximization ability helps resolve the existing
disagreement about decision difficulty, because it balances
the theoretical and practical experience of maximizers.
Specifically, in line with the arguments of Dalal et al.
(2015), Diab et al. (2008), Lai (2010), and Weinhardt et al.
(2012), it is theoretically true that, at least in a perfect world,
maximizers do not necessarily need to experience decision
difficulty. In a hypothetical choice situation involving the
consideration of three options, two of which are clearly sub-
optimal across all dimensions and the third of which is there-
fore clearly the best across all dimensions (i.e., dominant),
a maximizer’s choice would likely be quite simple and in-
volve little, if any, decision difficulty (see also Ma & Roese,
2014). Accordingly, it is not justifiable to include the expe-
rience of decision difficulty in our model of maximization.
However, the real world, at least for the average American
consumer, is one of consumer freedom and choice overload,
in which it is likely incredibly difficult — if not outright
impossible — to find the best option (e.g., Broniarczyk &
Griffin, 2014; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz et al., 2002). In-
deed, in many cases, the proliferation of choices may make
the cost of finding the best too high, such that consumers
do not have the time or other resources to identify the best
option (Schwartz, 2004; see also Simon, 1955, 1956). Thus,
it is likely that, in line with the arguments of Schwartz et al.
(2002), Nenkov et al. (2008), Rim et al. (2011), Turner et
al. (2012), and Richardson et al. (2014), maximizers do tend
to experience greater levels of decision difficulty, such that,
in practice, decision difficulty often seems endemic to max-
imization. Studying maximization ability thus integrates the
theoretical and the practical because it facilitates the consid-
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eration of maximizers’ decision experience when they make
choices in the real world among thousands of possible op-
tions.
Distinguishing between components, outcomes, and
moderators of outcomes of maximization may also help
shed light on previous conflicting conclusions about the po-
tentially negative effects of maximization for satisfaction
and well-being. As mentioned earlier, one consistent find-
ing is that measures that focus on the maximization goal
(i.e., the “high standards” component of maximization; e.g.,
the MTS and the high standards subscale of the MS-S) do
not appear to predict unhappiness, dissatisfaction with life,
or depression. It may thus be that when considered indepen-
dent of the maximization strategy and other moderators such
as maximization ability, the maximization goal is not detri-
mental to well-being. Moreover, high self-esteem and opti-
mism may increase the desire for the best, because people
who see themselves as successful may also see themselves
as deserving of the best.
When maximization strategy and ability enter into the
picture, however, the implications for maximization may
become more negative. Previous research has highlighted
that the tendency to seek out and compare alternatives often
predicts lower life satisfaction (e.g., Nenkov et al., 2008),
perhaps because of how comparison underlines negative at-
tributes of choice options (e.g., Brenner, Rottenstreich &
Sood, 1999), and this relationship may be stronger in some
situations than in others, or stronger for some people (e.g.,
unhappy people; Schwartz et al., 2002) than for others. As
the number of options increase, for instance, the alternative
search strategy likely becomes more detrimental to well-
being. In fact, a mathematical time allocation model re-
cently developed by Álvarez, Rey and Sanchis (2014; see
also Álvarez, Rey & Sanchis, 2016) posits exactly that re-
lationship: for small choice sets, searching through all al-
ternatives in an attempt to find the best may be the optimal
choice strategy, but as the size of the choice set increases,
the maximization strategy undermines well-being and satis-
ficing becomes a more adaptive approach to decision mak-
ing (see also Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009).
Thus, although the maximization strategy may be related
to unhappiness, we predict that moderators like the ability
to maximize should be most predictive of well-being. Ex-
periencing more difficulty in achieving optimization should
lead to more unhappiness, depression, and dissatisfaction
than comparing among alternatives and ultimately succeed-
ing in finding the best option. Having the goal of maximiza-
tion and following the maximization strategy but lacking the
ability to maximize successfully may therefore be the ulti-
mate recipe for unhappiness. In summary, then, taking a per-
son x situation approach to the study of maximization will
help answer pressing questions about when and why max-
imizers are less happy, in addition to adding important nu-
ance to the study of individual differences in decision mak-
ing goals and strategies (Appelt et al., 2011; Norem, 2012).
5.3 Domain-specific maximization
As researchers attend more to the role of situations in maxi-
mization research, it will also be important for future inves-
tigations to further explore the implications of maximiza-
tion within specific domains. With the exception of Mikkel-
son and Pauley’s (2013) RMS, maximization scales have
been designed to measure domain-general maximization un-
der the assumption that maximizers will maximize in most,
if not all, contexts. Although it is likely that maximizers
do maximize in more contexts than satisficers (Schwartz et
al., 2002; see also Fleeson, 2001), future research may also
benefit from considering domain-specific instances of max-
imization, perhaps because domain-specific scales better
predict domain-specific maximization, because some max-
imizers’ behavior is more domain-specific than previously
predicted, or because people are generally more likely to
maximize in some domains than in others (e.g., Carter &
Gilovich, 2010).
Two choice domains that have received particular atten-
tion in maximization research are career decision making
(e.g., Iyengar et al., 2006; Leach & Patall, 2013; Paivandy
et al., 2008; van Vianen, De Pater & Preenan, 2009) and ro-
mantic relationship choice (e.g., Long & Campbell, 2015;
Mikkelson & Pauley, 2013; Yang & Chiou, 2010). Hence,
career- and relationship-specific measures of maximization
may be particularly useful for future research, though we
note that the RMS does not necessarily fit well with our
two-component model of maximization. Accordingly, re-
searchers might consider developing domain-specific mea-
sures of maximization that more closely reflect the maxi-
mization goal and strategy outlined in this paper.
5.4 The role of culture
Finally, more work must be done to determine how max-
imization functions across different cultures, as this is an
issue for both scale construction and scale interpretation.
Some preliminary research suggests that the relations be-
tween maximization and well-being differ across cultures
(Datu, in press; Faure, Joulain & Osiurak, 2015; Moyano-
Díaz et al., 2013; Oishi, Tsutsui, Eggleston & Galinha,
2014; Roets, Schwartz & Guan, 2012). On the other hand,
researchers have drawn conclusions about the general, po-
tentially universal, measurement and consequences of max-
imization from research in at least four different societies:
the U.S. (e.g., Diab et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2002;
Turner et al., 2012), Norway (Lai, 2010), Chile (Moyano-
Díaz et al., 2014), and Italy (Misuraca et al., 2015). Thus,
we regard the matter as unresolved and in need of further
empirical and theoretical attention. Researchers should take
care to attend to the possible implications of cultural differ-
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ences for maximization; indeed, it is possible that our two-
component model will not generalize across all cultures.
6 Conclusion
In an attempt to clarify the contradictory literature on
the meaning and measurement of maximization, we re-
viewed the 11 published maximization measures, striving
to highlight similarities and differences among different re-
searchers’ conceptualizations of maximization. We then
introduced a two-component model of maximization that
posits that maximization can be understood as the pursuit of
the maximization goal of choosing the best option through
the maximization strategy of alternative search. Our aim
throughout was to clarify concepts, in the belief that con-
ceptual clarity is essential if we are to ascertain both how
to interpret existing data and what new data need collecting
in the future. We hope that this review has helped create
a clearer path for future research, and that we are now one
step closer to maximizing the study of maximization.
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Appendix: Maximization scales
Maximization Scale (MS, Schwartz et al., 2002)
1. When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning
through the available options even while attempting to
watch one program.
2. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check
other stations to see if something better is playing, even
if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to.
3. I treat relationships like clothing: I expect to try a lot on
before I get to the perfect fit.
4. No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right
for me to be on the looked out for better opportunities.
5. I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite dif-
ferent from my actual life.
6. I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the
best movies, the best singers, the best athletes, the best
novels, etc.).
7. I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend.
8. When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing that
I really love.
9. Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling
to pick the best one.
10. I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just writ-
ing a letter to a friend, because it’s so hard to word
things just right. I often do several drafts of even simple
things.
11. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
12. I never settle for second best.
13. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t
present at the moment.
Short Form Maximization Scale (MS-S,
Nenkov et al., 2008)
High Standards Subscale
1. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
2. I never settle for second best.
Alternative Search Subscale
1. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check
other stations to see if something better is playing, even
if I am relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to.
2. No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right
for me to be on the lookout for better opportunities.
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Decision Difficulty Subscale
1. I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend.
2. Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling
to pick the best one.
Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS, Diab et al.,
2008)
1. No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best
thing.
2. I don’t like having to settle for “good enough.”
3. I am a maximizer.
4. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
5. I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it
takes.
6. I never settle for second best.
7. I am uncomfortable making decisions before I know all
of my options.
8. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t
present at the moment.
9. I never settle.
Modified Maximization Scale (MMS, Lai,
2010)
1. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t
present at the moment.
2. My decisions are well thought through.
3. I am uncomfortable making decisions before I know all
of my options.
4. Before making a choice, I consider many alternatives
thoroughly.
5. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
Revised Short Form Maximization Scale (MS-
S-R, Weinhardt et al., 2012)
High Standards Subscale
1. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
2. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t
present at the time.
Alternative Search Subscale
1. When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning
through the available options even while attempting to
watch one program.
2. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check
other stations to see if something better is playing, even
if I am relatively satisfied with what I am listening to.
Decision Difficulty Subscale
1. I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend.
2. When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing that
I really love.
3. Renting videos is really difficult. I’m always struggling
to pick the best one.
4. I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just writ-
ing a letter to a friend, because it’s so hard to word
things just right. I often do several drafts of even simple
things.
Revised Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS-R,
Weinhardt et al., 2012)
1. I don’t like having to settle for good enough.
2. I am a maximizer.
3. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
4. I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it
takes.
5. I never settle for second best.
6. I never settle.
7-Item Maximizing Tendency Scale (MTS-7,
Dalal et al., 2015)
1. I don’t like having to settle for good enough.
2. I am a maximizer.
3. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
4. I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it
takes.
5. I never settle for second best.
6. I never settle.
7. No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best
thing.
Maximization Inventory (MI, Turner et al.,
2012)
Alternative Search Scale
1. I can’t come to a decision unless I have carefully con-
sidered all of my options.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 11, No. 2, March 2016 The meaning of maximization 145
2. I take time to read the whole menu when dining out.
3. I will usually continue shopping for an item until it
reaches all of my criteria.
4. I usually continue to search for an item until it reaches
my expectations.
5. When shopping, I plan on spending a lot of time looking
for something.
6. When shopping, if I can’t find exactly what I’m looking
for, I will continue to search for it.
7. I find myself going to many different stores before find-
ing the thing I want.
8. When shopping for something, I don’t mind spending
several hours looking for it.
9. I take the time to consider all alternatives before making
a decision.
10. When I see something I want, I always try to find the
best deal before purchasing it.
11. If a store doesn’t have exactly what I’m shopping for,
then I will go somewhere else.
12. I just won’t make a decision until I am comfortable with
the process.
Decision Difficulty Scale
1. I usually have a hard time making even simple deci-
sions.
2. I am usually worried about making a wrong decision.
3. I often wonder why decisions can’t be more easy.
4. I often put off making a difficult decision until a dead-
line.
5. I often experience buyer’s remorse.
6. I often think about changing my mind after I have al-
ready made my decision.
7. The hardest part of making a decision is knowing that I
will have to leave the item I didn’t choose behind.
8. I often change my mind several times before making a
decision.
9. It’s hard for me to choose between two good alterna-
tives.
10. Sometimes I procrastinate in deciding even if I have a
good idea of what decision I will make.
11. I find myself often faced with difficult decisions.
12. I do not agonize over decisions. (R)
Satisficing Scale
1. I usually try to find a couple of good options and then
choose between them.
2. At some point you need to make a decision about things.
3. In life I try to make the most of whatever path I take.
4. There are usually several good options in a decision sit-
uation.
5. I try to gain plenty of information before I make a deci-
sion, but then I go ahead and make it.
6. Good things can happen even when things don’t go right
at first.
7. I can’t possibly know everything before making a deci-
sion.
8. All decisions have pros and cons.
9. I know that if I make a mistake in a decision that I can
go “back to the drawing board.”
10. I accept that life often has uncertainty.
Relational Maximization Scale (RMS, Mikkel-
son & Pauley, 2013)
1. I constantly compare my current relationship to other
potential relationships.
2. No matter how satisfied I am in my current relationship,
I am always on the lookout for a better relationship.
3. I wonder if I would be happier in another relationship.
4. I always like to keep my relational options open.
5. I compare my current relationship to my past relation-
ships to see if my current relationship is better.
6. I won’t settle for second best in my romantic relation-
ships.
7. I don’t want to settle for a relationship that is “good
enough.”
8. I know what I want in a relationship and I won’t com-
promise.
9. I believe I can find the best relationship for me and I
won’t settle.
10. In relationships, I am unwilling to settle for less than I
feel I deserve.
11. Finding a relational partner is difficult because I want to
choose the perfect person for me.
12. I have a hard time choosing a relational partner.
13. I always struggle to pick the right relational partner.
14. I have a hard time finding a relational partner that I re-
ally like.
15. I only commit to a relationship when I know all my ex-
pectations are going to be met.
16. I am more selective about my choice of partner than
most.
Refined Maximization Scale (MS-R, Richard-
son et al., 2014)
Want the Best Factor
1. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check
other stations to see if something better is playing, even
if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to.
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2. When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning
through the available options even while attempting to
watch one program.
3. Even if I see a choice I really like, I have a hard time
making the decision if I do not have a chance to check
out other possible options.
Decision Difficulty Factor
1. Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that aren’t
present at the moment.
2. No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right
for me to be on the lookout for better opportunities.
3. I always keep my options open so I will not miss the
next best choice available in life.
Regret Factor
1. I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite dif-
ferent from my actual life.
2. Whenever I made a choice, I’m curious about what
would have happened if I had chosen differently.
3. Whenever I made a choice, I try to get information
about how the other alternatives turned out.
4. When I think about how I’m doing in life, I often assess
opportunities I have passed up.
Decision Making Tendency Inventory (DMTI,
Misuraca et al., 2015)
Fearful Maximizing Subscale
1. In all decisions that affect my work or studying, I am
always afraid of not choosing the best options.
2. Renting videos is really difficult. I am always struggling
to pick the best one.
3. When shopping, I have a hard time findings clothing
that I really love.
4. Whenever I am faced with a choice, I try to imagine
what all the other possibilities are, even ones that are
not present at the moment.
5. When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check
other stations to see if something better is playing, even
if I am relatively satisfied with what I am listening to.
6. To assure that I get the best deal, I always consult con-
sumer product reviews before buying.
Resolute Maximizing Subscale
1. In studying or working, I always set the highest targets.
2. No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for
myself.
3. I never settle for second best.
4. I never settle.
5. No matter how satisfied I amwith my job, it is only right
for me to be on the lookout for better opportunities.
Less Ambitious Satisficing Subscale
1. If I am happy with my work, I do not seek better oppor-
tunities.
2. In choosing between alternatives, I stop at the first that
works for me.
3. I do not ask for more than what satisfies me.
4. When I watch TV or listen to the radio, I tend to follow
the first program that I find interesting.
More Ambitious Satisficing Subscale
1. In every area, I try to achieve results that are satisfactory
for me.
2. In studying or working, I tend to choose solutions that
guarantee satisfactory results for me.
3. When I make decisions, I spend the time required to
choose an alternative that is satisfactory for me.
4. In studying or working, I spend the time required to
choose solutions that meets my needs.
Parsimonious Minimizing Subscale
1. When I buy clothes, I choose the ones that I really need
at the lowest price.
2. When I buy something, I seek only the cheapest prod-
ucts.
3. When I am at the grocery store, I look around to find
lower-priced products, even if they are an off-brand.
4. When purchasing any type of product, I do not care
about quality. I only care about functionality.
5. I am not willing to waste much time and energy to buy
a quality clothing.
Indolent Minimizing Subscale
1. In studying or working, I set targets to be achieved with
minimal effort.
2. I always set targets to be achieved with minimal effort.
3. In studying or working, I am okay with any choice that
yields the minimum result.
4. In studying or working, even the minimum result may
be fine.
5. When I have to make a decision, I choose the option that
meets the absolute minimum.
